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We shall consider the most common instances of changes in the
legal character of estates, that have actually arisen in cases, and
which may be classed generally as changes in the relative rights,
and changes in the absolute rights of property.
First, as to changes in the relative rights of property.
The principle of our modern law and of our modern civilization, as opposed to the spirit of ancient times, is to allow the greatest
possible freedom in the individual use and disposition of property
compatible with the interests of the whole community.
The object of legislation, as far as property is concerned, is to
secure and protect this freedom. As we saw at the outset, the general principle underlying legislative power over property, is that of
protection. To this end are its general and prospective enactments
presumed to be made. These determine what shall be the legal
I We conclude this interesting and useful essay with this number. Its length is
greater than we could wish, but its value justifies the space it fills in our pages.Ed. Am. .L. Beg.
VoL. VII.-38
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character of estates, how they may be alienated, what shall be the
methods of descent and distribution, &c., &c., and how the rights in
property shall be enforced. All the methods provided by legislation for the security or regulation of natural rights, are relative
rights.
But when, under the constitution, the legislature has once
established the legal character of property, and provided securities
and remedies for its free ownership, what further power has it ?
Thus far it has exercised, as all acknowledge, a purely legislative
power. It has declared what the law shall be, and left it to the
judicial power to apply. Does it continue to keep within the bounds
of its proper functions when it alters, amends, or repeals its former
provisions or enactments? Or when it provides for a general
suspension of a law, or for a special dispensation in favor of a particular person ?
The right to pass laws of amendment and repeal seems to be
fully acknowledged, although, by the operation of the repealing act,
pending proceedings for the enforcement of rights in property, are
brought to an end, and thus existing rights acquired by law are
taken away.' "It will not be denied," says Savage, J., in Peeple
vs. Livingston,2 that it is competent for the legislature to repeal
an act upon which a suit has been brought; and if the repeal is
absolute, such suit is at an end."
It is held to be as much within
the power of the legislature to amend or repeal existing laws, to
suit the wants of the advancing age, as it was originally within its
power to enact the laws. Such repealing acts do not violate the
provisions of the federal constitution. For, as we have seen,
rights acquired under general laws passed for the good of the
community, are not rights of "contract."
The latitudinary distinction, also, between the obligation of a contract and its remedy, which
we have before noticed, affords a wide field for the exercise of the
repealing power. So that it is, in general, only such acts as repeal
legislative grants to an individual or a corporation, as in liletcher vs.
Peck,3 that clearly violate this provision.
IStoever vs. Immell, 1 Watts, 258; Butler vs. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Williams vs.
County, &c., 35 Maine, 345.
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Some cases in England and in this country have shown a disposi.tion to restrain, to the closest verge of judicial right, this legislative
interference with the rights of parties, so far as existing rights of
action are concerned.' And the courts will not construct a law altering a previous law, as having a retrospective action, unless the
legislature to this 'effect is manifested by the most unequivocal.
2
expressions.
Repealing statutes do not violate the provisions of the state constitution, since being universally applicable to the whole community,
they are the general law of the land; and since by the complete
abrogation of the old law by its repeal, or of one of its provisions
by an amendment, no judicial discrimination between the rights of
individuals is exercised.
But the injustice of repealing acts, even so far as they affect
'merely the right to remedies, is well recognized, that it is the common
custom for the legislature to insert a saving clause, providing that
no existing rights acquired under a previous statute shall be affected
by its repeal.
The suspension of a law is but the repeal of it for a limited timeand is to be defended on the same grounds as the complete repeal
of a statute. This is considered one of the most obnoxious forms
in which the legislative power can be exercised; yet it is admitted
The Massachusetts
as existing even by those who reprobate its use'
court reluctantly admit the power in Holden vs. James,4 while denying the right to grant a special dispensation.
As a consequence from this right to pass suspending laws, some
have deduced the right to dispense with a law in a particular case,
on the principle, that power over the whole embraces authority over
all the parts.5
Barlamqui suggested this argument.6 He says, "If the legislature
can entirely abrogate a law, by a much stronger reason can it
I Hitchcock

vs. Way, 6 Ad. & El., 943; Padd6n vs. Bartlett, 3 Ad. & Ellis, 884;

See 2 Dwarris on Statuter, 542; Bedford vs. Shilling, 4 S. & R., 401; Duffield vs.
Smith, 3 S. & R., 590; Butler vs. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Palmer vs. Curly, 2 Corns.
182; Grover vs. Com., 1 Corns. 536.
2 Opinions of Kent, J., and Thompson, J., in Dash vs. Van Kleek, 7 J. R., 477.
513 Am. Jur., 74.
314 Am. Jur., 84.
'11 Mass., 396.

9Principles of Natural Law, Part I, Ch. X,

13.
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suspend the effect thereof with regard to any particular person."
But this principle cannot be taken as an axiom in legislation. Thep
general power of laying taxes does not include the power of
imposing them upon a particular portion of the people, leaving the
rest unburdened.'
If it did mathematically, independently of a constitution, it does
under the state constitutions. So the general power of suspending
the laws does not include the special power of dispensation, or at
least does not under our state constitutions.2 For what is the
suspension of a law ? It is its abrogation for the time being, so
that the condition of all persons is the same as though no such law
existed. But in the case of an exemption of a particular perspn
from its operation, there is no abrogation of the law. The fact that
an exemption is granted, and thought necessary, recognizes the law
as still standing, and of full force on the statute books, and in the
ourts. There is no suspension. Let a case other than the exempted
one arise, and no one fails to see that the law is active. It is true,
that as to the rights of the person who is exempted, the law, if the
command of the legislature were obeyed by the courts, -would be, as
it were, annihilated. But this could be no suspension of the law
itself within the constitutional right of suspension. This is the
doctrine of the Massachusetts court in "Picquet App't" and Holden
vs. James, and the court, (under the provisions of the Constitution
of Massachusetts, requiring that no person shall be deprived of his
property, immunities &c., but by the judgment of his peers or the law
of the land,3 and declaring that personal rights should be protected by
the standing laws, 4) refused to recognize such legislative acts as valid
and constitutional. Besides violating these constitutional provisions,
a dispensing act conflicts with that one also which declares that the
legislature shall not exercise the functions or powers of the judiciary.
Some contend that the making of a law applicable to a particular
case is no more a judicial act than the making a general law
applicable to all cases.' But there is a palpable difference between
a law, based on equal rights, and extending its privileges or
114 Am. Jar., 86.
2'Picquet App't., 5 Pick. 69; Holden vs. James, 11 'Mass., 396.
513 Am. Jur., 82.
'Bill of Rights, Art. 10.
3Part I, 12.
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disabilities to every member of the community, and one which selects
a person out from among his fellow citizens, and gives him privileges
which have the effect of divesting rights belonging to others under
an unrepealed and existing general law.
Unless such a special law is passed as a matter of course whoever
may apply, (which is hardly a supposable case) it must be passed on
account of the merits of a particular case, the determination of which,
since it affects existing rights of other parties, is ajudicial function.'
A special legislative act, therefore, changing the legal character
of estates by dispensing with a law in favor of a particular person,
is unconstitutional, as violating the state constitutions. But general
laws of repeal and suspension are consistent with the State constitutions, however much they may change the character of estates; and
are perfectly constitutional, unless they impair a contract-right under
the provision of the federal constitution, which we have seen, could
happen only in a limited number of cases. For a law of repeal
simply takes away what the legislature has itself once given. It is
only in a few instances that a legislative act is in the nature of a
contract, since the great body of legislation has to do with public
interests, and consists of provisions for the public good, which do
not carry with them a contract on the part of the state that they
shall remain unchanged forever. Perhaps, we may say as a general proposition, that whatever the legislature confers it may take
away, considering every right that is protected by the constitution,
as having its source really in the constitution and not in the legislature. We should then have left, as property within the control of
the legislature, all matters of remedy and of relative right that are
not positively regulated by the constitution. . The withdrawal of
rights and privileges once conferred strikes the sense of every one as
liable to work injustice, and therefore reprehensible. The evil lies
in the retrospective character of such an act. But for redress in
such cases we must appeal to the legislature itself, or to the people.
For acts of repeal, though retroactive, are constitutional. Even new
laws directly retrospective, as well as the repeal of old laws, may be
114 Am. Jar., 97.
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constitutional. Retrospective laws are universally odious.' Yet
they are valid unless prohibited by constitutional provisions. In
the constitution of New Jersey there is an express provision that no
law shall deprive a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract
which existed when the contract was made. 2 In the constitution of
New Hampshire it is declared that retrospective laws are "highly
injurious, 6ppressive and unjust. No such law should be made
' '3
either for the decision of civil cases, or the punishment of offences.
In the constitutions of Tennessee, North Carolina and Maryland there
are provisions prohibiting retrospective laws ; but they have been
held as simply equivalent to provisions forbidding the imparing of
4
the obligation of contracts.
Unless expressly prohibited, as in the constitution of New Jersey,
or impliedly prohibited under other provisions of the state constitutions, retrospective laws are valid.
For the provision in the federal constitution prohibiting the
passage of ex post facto laws, it has been abundantly settled, applies
to criminal cases only.'
But the courts will construe a statute as prospective, whenever
they can, and will not interpret it as retroactive, unless absolutely
required by its express terms.'
There is a large class of cases in which the legislature interposes to
confirm acts invalid by reason of some informality-as to declare
acts of persons irregularly elected to office valid, to confirm marriages defectively celebrated, or a sale of lands defectively made or
acknowledged. These laws have never been questioned, although
by such enactment individuals may be deprived of right of property
I Puffendorf-Droit de Is Nature, L. I., a. 6
VII. c. 3; Bacon's Abridgment, Statutes.
2
3Part I. 23.
Art. IV. e. 7 3.

6; Ld. Bacon, De. Aug. Scient. L.
41 Peck. Tenn. R., 17.

5Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall., 386; Dash vs. Van Kleck, 7 Johns, 477; Watson vs.
Merccr, 8 Pet., 110; Satterlee vs. Matthewson, 2 Pet., 380.
6Johnson vs. Burrell, 2 Hill, 238; Bayley vs. Mayor, 7 Hill, 146; Peeple vs.
Carnal, 2 Selden, 463 ; Lawrence vs. Miller, 2 Cons. 245, 251 ; Boyd vs. Barrenger,
23 Miss., 270; 24 Miss., 377; Murray t's. Gibson, 15 How. (U. S.) 421; McCabe vs.
Emerson, 6 Harris, (Penn.) 111; Plumb vs. Sawyer, 21 Conn., 351; Austin vs.
Stevens, 24 Me., 520.
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previously vested. The rights, such as they are, which are divested
by statutes of this kind, are not considered as protected by any
constitutional provision. Such laws, so far as they cure defects, are
not considered as impairing the obligation of contracts, or as divesting
any right secured by the law of the land, or as creating any new
right; but as confirming rights already existing, by furthering the
remedy. The legal rights of others affected in these cases are
deemed to have vested subject to the equity existing against them,
which equity these confirming statutes recognize and enforce.' In
Foster vs. Essex Bank, 2 Parker 0. J. says, that the power to correct
errors and mistakes has been immemorially exercised, and is within
the constitutional power of the legislature. For it is doing no one
wrong to prevent his taking advantage of a mere error or mistake.
Such a law does not impair the force or obligation of contracts, but
on the contrary, provides a way for enforcing them. "There is no
such thing," say the courts, "as a vested right to do wrong, and
a legislature, which, in its acts, not expressly authorized by the constitution, limits itself to correcting mistakes, cannot be charged with
violating its duty, or exceeding its authority." The power to pass
such laws is so necessary, that its absence would lead to serious consequences. 3
In the case of Fostervs. Essex Bank, and also in numerous
others, 4 the courts dwell largely upon the justice and public tranquillity that are promoted by these laws of amendment and confirmation; and in speaking of certain retrospective laws as being valid,
take care to qualify their language, by calling them such as are just
and reasonable, and conduce to the general welfare, and are not
clearly unjust. But it will be found that justice is not the criterion
by which the cases are decided. It is satisfactory to know, and
is worthy of being illustrated, that in such instances justice is usually
1 Goshen vs. Stonington, 4 Conn., 209; Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Pet., 627; Langdon vs. Strong, 2 Vt., 234; Watson vs. Mercer, 8 Pet., 88; Foster vs. Essex Bank,
16 Mass., 245; Hepburn vs. Cults, 7 Watts, 350; Underwood vs. Lilly, 10 S. & R.,
97; 10 Ohio, 599; Kearney vs. Taylor, 15 How., 494.
216 Mass., 245.
31 Kent Com., 455; Syracuse Bank vs. Davis, 16 Barb, (S. C.) 188.
4Asin 4 Conn., 226; 6 Conn., 58, 198; 7 Conn., 319, 351; See 1 Kent, 455.
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vindicated. But the real test, we should remember, in determining
the validity of a retroactive law is, if there be no express constitutional provision, whether the right it impairs is one of contract
or not, or is a right which is divested without due course of law, or
is a right which should be determined judicially.1 We have seen
that such laws as cure mere defects in form or remedy, do not impair
the obligation of any contract. Neither do they trespass on the
judicial functions, since they are cases in which the courts can give
no remedy. Nor do they violate the "law of the land," in the
divesting of rights, since equitable rights are confirmed rather than
divested, and the spirit of the law of the land is carried out by the
curing of mere defects in form.
A late statute of Massachusetts, 2. confirming titles of third parties to estates conveyed without a release of homestead, about
which there has been some difference of opinion, would seem to
come under the class of cases just considered, so far as it affects
conveyances made bona fide with intention of conveying the whole
estate. But if we suppose a case, where a homestead was intentionally and innocently reserved by this means, the parties being
actually cognizant of, and having in view all the provisions of the
existing laws, here it would seem that by a peremptory law, confirming as perfect grants, all such conveyances, a substantial right
of property in the original grantor could be taken away without
his consent or intention, and not a mere defect of form cured. It
might now be questioned, whether a contract right was not being
impaired, and whether the due course of law was not being violated.
A general law, though usually less obnoxious than a special act,
would, in this case, seem to work more injustice, from the very
absence of discrimination; and yet if the legislature attempted to
grant, on application only, special acts, it might have to decide
between conflicting private claims and rights, and thus trespass on
the judicial function.
Perhaps a general law might be framed, so as to avoid these
objections, by providing that, upon the finding of certain facts
Sedgwick on Constitutional Law, 202.
2

Laws of 1857, ch. 298.
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before a competent court, that is, such facts as show an invalidity
in matters of form alone, so that the intentions of the parties are
not fulfilled, the defect may be cured and the deed made valid
against the grantor. But the whole subject of retrospective laws,
is of great difficulty. Yet we can at least say, that the legal
character of estates may be changed by retroactive laws, so far as
rights to remedies and to forms are concerned, and that there is
nothing, therefore, in a retrospective law per se to make it unconstitutional.
We have thus far considered some of the changes in the legal
character of estates affected by general or special legislative acts,
which touch a remedy, a form, or what we have expressed by the
general term, "relative rights," meaning by the term, those rights
of property conferred upon a person by the government in his
relations to other persons. They are equivalent to those civil rights
in property, which are the gift of government, and do not exist in
nature.
As distinguished from these, there is another class which we have
called "absolute rights" in property; meaning the rights which
belong to a person as an individual whether in relation to others or
not, and which are said to exist in nature, therein corresponding to
natural rights, and not from government. Life, liberty, and property are called in the books, absolute rights, as distinguished from
other rights. We apply the terms and distinction to separate the
various rights in property itself. We proceed then to
Second-The changes made in the absolute rights of estates.
Here we are to consider classeg of legislative enactments that
directly touch substantial rights, which are not confined in their
operation to remedies and privileges conferred by the legislature
itself, but which have to do with immunities existing independently
of legislative provisions. These acts are such as affect the nature
and ownership of the property itself, and not the nature of its
incidents alone.
There is an entire class of these enactments, that come under
what is termed the paternal or guardian power of the state. The
property of infants, idiots, lunatics, persons not known, or not in
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being, is often changed in its character, from real into personal, or
vice versa, by authority conferred by general or special acts of the
legislature.
As it is the part of the legislature to establish the legal character
of estates, and make provisions for the security of property, it must
be a duty, as well as a power, for it to provide for the security of
the property of those who are unable to act for themselves.
Any general prospective law, therefore, which empowers courts
or guardians to manage or invest the property of such incapacitated persons, according to their best discretion, will be acknowledged by all as a valid exercise of legislative power. Such a
power cannot be construed as unconstitutional under any reasonable construction of constitutional limitations.'
But when this is not done by a general law, but by a special act
applicable to a special instance, is there any difference of principle ?
The adjudged cases say, there is not.
The case of Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital,2 is a good representative case on this point. A testator left by his will, real estate
to be held by trustees ; the income to be applied for the benefit of
his daughters during their lives-at their decease, the trust-estate to
go to their issue, if any, otherwise to their heirs at law. Before
the appointment of trustees, the daughters sold and made conveyances of portions of the estate. The legislature passed a special
act confirming these conveyances, and also,. in compliance with the
petition of all parties in being interested in the property, provided"
that a trustee, who should be appointed, should have power to sell
the rest of the estate, and apply the proceeds to the use and benefit
of those having the life estate, and also for the benefit of those
having the remainder, according as they were entitled under the
will. It was held that this latter provision for the sale of the
estate, in which the interests of those in remainder, and not in
beirg, were protected, was valid and constitutional. The legal
character of the estate of the remainder-men was changed, it is
I See case of Bedford, on petition before Judge Hickey of Kentucky, reported in
10 Am. Jur., 297.
23 Cush., 492.
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true, and without their consent, since they were not in being. But
the paternal power over the property of such persons was held to
exist in the legislature; the exercise of which did not deprive any
one of his property without due course of law, since it merely
changed real into personal estate for the benefit of all the parties
in interest, without divesting the property itself. The court cited
with approbation, Bice vs. Parkman,' where it was held that a
special law authorizing a tenant for life to sell the whole estate;
provision being made for securing the interests of those in remainder, was valid-the same principle being maintained and illustrated
in -Davison vs. e"ohannot.2 The New York and Pennsylvania
3
courts have fully supported the same doctrine.
In Cochran vs. Van Surley, the New York courts say, that a
special act authorizing the sale of the real estate of infants, for
their maintenance and education, does not impair the obligation of
any contract. For a contract implies some reciprocity between
the parties, some mutuality of compact. But the right derived
under a will cannot, except by a stretch of legal and ordinary
language, be called a contract. There is no method by which
infants and other incapacited persons can acquire rights to property
by contracts. An act, therefore, authorizing a change in. the nature
of their estates, does not impair the obligation of contracts. Nor as
was held in Sohier vs. Mass. Gen. .Hospital,does it divest property
without due course of law. Does it trespass at all upon the judicial
power ? It is certainly not in the nature of a judicial decree, nor
does it settle any private controversies, nor determine the rights of
any party; which as we have seen, are the general characteristics
of a judicial act.
No rights are in dispute, no controversy exists. Were it so, we
imagine that no legislature would pass such a law, until the courts
had determined the relations of the respective rights. Even under
the omnipotent parliament of England, where private acts were of
frequent use for the unfettering of estates from entanglements of
16 Mass., 326.
27 Met., 388.
Clarke vs. Van Surley, 15 Wend., 436; Cochran vs. Van Surley, 20 Wend., 365;
Baurbraugh v.Ditts, 11 S. & R., 191; Estep vs. Hutchman, 14 S. & R., 435.
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contingent remainders, springing uses, &c., so as to assure a good
title to a purchaser against the remote and latent claims of infants,
or other persons at the time disabled from acting, not only was a
proper equivalent settled upon these latter persons in proportion to
their interests, but the consent of all parties was obtained, if possible,
and the rights of all those in being who did not assent, were expressly
saved.'
So with us, we imagine that a legislature passes such acts only
upon the petition of all the parties interested, who are in being,
and capable of giving assent. Were there any dispute or controversy, and rights were determined by the l~gislative enactment,
or legal claims upon the estate indirectly adjudicated, it would quite
plainly be an exercise of judicial power. For instance:
Jones vs. Perry,2 a case sometimes erroneously cited against the
validity of all acts of this kind, was an example of such an act
having a judicial character. A guardian was authorized to sell the
land of his infant ward for the payment of debts. The act was held
unconstitutional on the ground that it was the judicial function to
decide whether any debts legally existed against the estate or
not.
It is true that in Davison vs. Johannot,' the Massachusetts court
decided, that an act authorizing a guardian to sell a part of an infant's estate for the payment of an incumbrance upon another portion, was constitutional. But here the incumbrance appears to have
been acknowledged, and the great question before the court seems
to have been as to the validity of the act in changing the real estate
into personal. The court upholds strenuously the guardian power
of the state, and on this principle and the authority of previous
cases, rests this opinion. It did not seem to think the case such
an one as required a decision as to the judicial character of such an
act, or one that was different from the previous case of Bice vs.
Parkman,where there was no provision as to the payment of debts.
But in'Jones vs. Perry,4 this phase of the question was presented,
and very elaborately examined, and it was argaed with much show
of reason by the court, that the legislative act, in directing the
'2 Black. Core., 345.

2 10 Yerger, 59.

3 7 Met., 388.

410 Yerger, 59.
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proceeds of the sale to be applied to the payment of debts, was a
judicial procedure, so far as it adjudicated that debts were due, and a
divesting of property without due course of law, in granting away
so much of the estate for a purpose which should have first been
examined by the proper judicial tribunals, as the parties interested
could have constitutionally claimed.
But the difficulty of the question, and the conflict of authorities,
are shown from the fact that in some cases," the courts have held
such special acts constitutional only when the proceeds are to be
applied to the payment of debts.
Yet this, at least, is settled, that where the authority given is
simply that of changing the nature of the estate, for the disabled
person's own benefit, though it touches what in general terms, as
applied to persons of full and perfect powers, would be called an
absolute or natural right, yet it is a valid act. For a mere change
in the form of property does not divest it, and such rights of the
infant &c., if they may be called rights,2 as are affected, are only such
as it is necessary to affect for their very protection. And, as we saw
at the outset, legislative power, in the absence of controlling constitutional provisions, may be explained by the principle that property
sacred from legislative interference, save when the protection of life,
liberty, or of property itself, requires its exercise. This is the
foundation of the "paternal power" of the legislature, which
Fletcher, J., says :' "it is deemed indispensable should reside in the
legislature to authorize the sale of the estates of infants and others
who cannot act for themselves. The best interests of these persons,
and justice to other persons, require it, and the legislature, as
"Parenspatrim," is to take care that the substantial rights of all
4
parties are protected.
The reasons which uphold the power of the legislature to change
the legal character of the estates of infants, remainder-men, and
persons not known, or not in being, ought, we should think, to sus'4 Monroe, 81 ; 6 Monroe, 594.

2As to which see 15 Wend., 436.
S5ohier vs. Mass. General Hospital, 3 Cushing.
'See further, 2 Peters, 627; 9 Ohio, 45; 8 Blackf., 10.

RIGHT OF LEGISLATURE

tain the power lately exercised by the Massachusetts Legislature in
authorizing the Supreme Court to change the trustees of the funds
left to the Cambridge Divinity School. The paternal power of the
legislature should certainly, on principle, extend over the cestui que
trusts of a charitable use as well as over infants and the like, not
always on the ground, perhaps, of individual incapacitJ-but on the
ground of collective incapacity to manage their own interests. A
large majority of those to be benefited by the Institution are not
yet in being, or at least are unknown.
Why should not the same "paternal power" be extended over whatever rights they may have in the bequests under consideration.
And if the legislature in one instance can change the character
of the property protected, by changing its very nature as real or
personal, why can it not change its character so far as to transfer
its management from one set of trustees to another?
Here again there must be brought before the legislature no
matters of controversy or conflicts of interests, requiring the exercise
of judicial functions. All such belong to the courts. But when
there is an unanimity of desire and of opinion among all the parties
concerned, that are in being, as to the way in which the interests
of the cestui que trusts can be best subserved, why should not this
case come under the principle of those just considered? In this
case the court, with a nice and proper regard for the limits of its
own power, has declared its inability to grant the desired relief.'
So that the legislature was certain that it was not usurping a
power which could be exercised by and belonged to the judiciary.
The court says, that as the law stands, which it is its duty to apply,
it cannot see its way clear to decreeing a change of trustees. Here,
then, are innumerable individuals, known and unknown, born and
unborn, legally and actually incapable of regulating their own
interests-their rights as beneficiaries of the trust can be best
promoted by a change of trustees, without violating, so far as it
appears, any right of contract without divesting any property, and
without infringing on the judicial power. 'Vhy should not the
"4paternal power" of the state include the right to change the legal
' Harvard College vs. Divinity School, 3 Gray, 280.
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character of their interest in the trust to the extent of changing the
hands in which the trust estate is held, the trustees themselves
desiring it, on petition ?
It is to be noticed that the legislative power over the legal
character of estates, based on the character of the state as "parens
patrie," is limited to changes in the kind and nature of the property, and cannot be extended to changes in the ownership, so as to
divest the least "jot or tittle," of the property itself. The rule
cannot be extended beyond its reason or excuse. Its reason is the
protection it affords the owner, its excuse, that it does not divest
property or a constitutional right. So soon as the property even
of an infant, is taken away, under cover of this paternal power, the
act is invalid. Thus in Sokier vs. .Mass. Gen. .Hospital,' the legislative act, so far as it confirmed previous unauthorized sales, in which
no provision was made for the interests of the infant or unknown
remainder-men, was declared unconstitutional, as divesting instead
of changing the nature of, their estates.
It is to be noticed also, that the reason and excuse of the rule
limit its application to cases where the owners of the property
affected are unable to act for themselves, and are not "sui juris."
If, therefore, the act touches the interests of one, who is known, of
full age and sound mind, and whose consent is not granted, it is
''2
invalid as to him. Thus in the case of ".Ervine's Appeal, the
legislative act under consideration authorized the Orphans' Court,
on application of the son of a certain testator, to order the sale of
real estate, the proceeds to be invested under the direction of the
court for the support of the son and for the interests of the remaindermen, according to the provisions of the will, which will, however,
directed that the estate should not be sold until after the son's death.
This act was held unconstitutional, since the parties in remainder,
whose consent was not made necessary by the act, and who objected,
3
were of full age, and under no disability.
The court in this last case said, that the duties of the state as
"pirens patrim," must necessarily and appropriately bn exercised
by the legislature, if the power had not been granted by the courts.
13

Cusb., 492.

216 Penn. (4 Harris,) 256.

3

See also 2 Selden, 358.
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This suggests the question, how these special acts are to be defended
when there is a general law existing applicable to the case, or a
general law which has given the power to the chancery or similar
courts. Is there, thien, any infringement on judicial power, or violation of due course of law ? Is this to be distinguished from the
case of a general law, when such an one exists, as a special dispensing act is from a general law of suspension? There does not
appear to be ground for such objections to these special acts.
The case of Bice vs. Parkman,' was one where there was a
general power of the same kind residing in the courts. Parker, C. J.
said, that this was not a judicial act, since it was not a case of controversy between party and party, nor any decree or judgment
affecting the title to property. But the Superior Court of New
2
Hampshire, on application of the legislature, gave their opinion,
" that no special act authorizing the sale of estates of minors was
constitutional, that no such act was necessary, since the courts of
probate had jurisdiction in such matters; and if their jurisdiction
was not sufficiently extensive, it might be enlarged by a general law,
but that a special act would be a judicial procedure, and contrary to
the due course of law." But as Wilde, J., remarks in -Davisonvs.
J'ohannot,3 this opinion was exparte, given without the assistance
of arguments, and not entitled to that authority which a decision
founded on a particular case is entitled to. Besides this, this
particular question is not very elaborately examined by the court.
The case of Cochranvs. -FanSurley,4 was one where the Chancery
courts had a general power over these matters. Yet the court said,
that if the legislature could pass the general law it might pass a
special law to accomplish the same end, especially when the sale
was to be made under the superintendence of the court of Chancery.
And the Pennsylvania court says, that when chancery, under a
general law, can order the same sales, the legislative act is 11invalid"
only, doing in one way what might be done in another.5
The distinction, therefore, between a special act of this kind and
a special dispensing act, is plain; the latter trespasses on the judicial
116 Mass., 326.

37 Met., 388.
24 N. H., 572.
516 Penna., 256; 2 Barr, 277.

'20 Wend., 865.
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function in determining rights, since it makes a provision contrary
to the general law-the former is merely "modal," and accords
with the due course of law, without determining between private
rights.
Besides the changes in the nature of property effected under the
"paternal power" of the state, the proposition is sometimes announced
as a general one that the tenure of any estate may be changed by
the substitution of one more beneficial to the owner. C. J. Parsons,
in H~olbrook vs. Finney,' remarked, that there seems to be no constitutional objection to the legislature's altering a tenure by substituting
another more beneficial, even by an act operating retrospectively.
As a general proposition, this is opposed to the principles we have
just been considering.
For here may be an alteration of the character of the property
of persons "1sui juris" without their consent. Tenures may be
altered prospectively, and then the nature of the property vested
will depend upon the law. But when altered by a retroactive law,
the very nature of the property once vested is changed. The
beneficial character of the change is not the criterion of its constitutionality. Even if it were, there might be some question on this point.
For as Mr. Sedgwick remarks,2 "the equity of such a conversion
might depend entirely on the relative ages and constitutions of the
parties." The act so far as it affected beneficially the rights of one
person by changing his estate by the way of enlargement only,
might not be unconstitutional as to him, did it not at the same time
affect the rights of another; for he could refuse the legislative
boon. Parties have a perfect right to waive the benefits of statutory
provisions, so far as they are concerned. 3 But one man's rights can
not be enlarged without affecting the rights of others in this case.
While the act is beneficial to one it may be detrimental to another.
But the statute of 1785, converting joint tenancies into tenancies
in common, under which the Massachusetts decisions are given,
1 4 Mass., 568; See also Miller vs. Miller, 16 Mass., 59; Annable vs. Patch, 3

Pick., 363; Burghardt vs. Turner, 12 Pick., 539.
2
Constitutional Law, 682, note.
'Ibid, 109, and cases cited.
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provided that a cage, where the intention of the grantor to create
a joint tenancy was clear, should be an exception to the law. So
the effect of the cases themselves, under this law, is not so extended and sweeping as the side remarks of the judges would
imply.
For the operation of the legislative act is confined to those cases
where the grantor did not expressly define the nature of the estate
granted. So that the effect of the law when it is applied, is not so
much to take away a tenure and substitute another, as to determine
what the tenure was which was granted.
The effect of the legislative act being to announce a rule of
construction for doubtful cases, the question would then occur,
whether the right to have the nature of one's property construed
according to the rules of the common law existing at the time it
vested, was a right protected by the constitution, or not ? When
reduced to this the right comes quite near the class of "relative
rights," and is less clearly outside of the legislative power.
Having considered the change effected in the relative rights of
property, either indirectly by altering, amending, suspending, or
dispensing with an -old law; or directly by a new law retroactive in
its character; and having considered the changes in the absolute
rights of property effected by altering its nature without divesting
the estate itself, -there remains to be considered that class of cases
in which the effect of the legislative act is to change the ownership or title.
The broad question which prese.nts itself under this head is,
whether (independently of eminent domain,) there is any power in
the legislature to divest the private ownership of property, either
with or without compensation. It would immediately strike every
one that it most certainly could not be done without compensation,
inasmuch as the.sovereign power of eminent domain even could not
be so exercised. But would the granting of an equivalent for the
property taken alter the nature of the act, and bring it any nearer
constitutionality ?
We have seen that if the property is acquired under a contract,
the federal constitution prevents its title or ownership being divested.
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No exception is made of cases where compensation is to be rendered.
If the property is affected one jot beyond its relative rights of remedy
and form, the act is unconstitutional. It may often be very difficult
to draw the line between the "obligation" of a contract and the
remedy, but the title or ownership of property is most certainly far
from the boundary line, and within the secure field of the "obligation."
If the property should not be of contract, then would the state constitutions come in with their requirements of "a due course of law"
and of abstinence on the part of the legislature from judicial acts.
Compensation here would make no difference.
The legislature shall not divest rights or immunities except by
general laws, such as are the law of the land, and such that under
them the right of the parties may be adjudicated by the courts.
This is the purport of the provisions of the State Constitutions.
The legislature cannot pass a statute for the very purpose of
working the wrong, and call this the law of the land.' And the
supplying the place of the property taken with a money equivalent,
would make it none the less a divesting of property. We have seen
how narrowly the acts changing the estates of infants, &c., and for
their benefit, escape coming within these provisions, and how strictly
they must be confined within their original reason and excuse.
Far from constitutional, therefore, must those acts be, which take
the private property of one,- for the use of other private citizens,
and supply its place with a money equivalent. The unconstitu2
tionality of such acts has been fully declared.
In Tayflor vs. Porter,3 it is held that an act authorizing a private
road to be laid out over the lands of a person without his consent,
was repugnant to the constitutional provisions requiring due course
of law to divest the property of a citizen.
Yet, if the legislature has power to exercise .the judicial function
and divest property, so far as to decree that debts are due from
an infant, or so far as to change retrospectively the tenure of the
1 Bronson, J., in 4 Hill, 140.
2 4 Hill, 140; 11 Wend. 149; 19 Wend. 651; 3 Paige, 45; 5 Paige, 137.

3 4 Hill, 140.
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lands of an adult, as seems, at first sight, to have been held in some
of the Massachusetts cases,' there would be difficulty in showing
why it might not equally well decree that a person was under
obligation to allow a private road to be built over his land, and so
change a part of his real estate into a money equivalent, given as
compensation. There would be no more divesting of property in
this case than when the property of an infant is taken to pay his
debts-and in some instances, as beneficial a change as when a
tenure is altered.
We see, therefore, how necessary it will be too confine the legislative power over absolute rights of property to those cases coming
strictly within the guardian power of the state, in which a mere
change in the nature of the property is made, and that to for the
benefit of incapacitated persons only.
We may illustrate the law under this head of absolute rights
2
still further, by cases. In Arrowsmith vs. Burlingin, the act of
Illinois under consideration, provided that every person in actual
possession of lands, under claim and color of title made in good faith,
who should continue in possession and pay all legal taxes for seven
years, should hold the legal title. Here was a divesting of the title
of those who were really the owners of the land, by a legislative
act, without due course of law. It was held unconstitutional as a
legislative conveyance of one man's land to another. Rights, as
the court remarked, are from nature-remedies are the invention
of society. The latter are changeable at the will of the legislative
department. But rights cannot be invaded.
In Norman vs. Heist,' a special act of the Pennsylvania Assembly
declared the children of a particular bastard capable of inheriting
and transmitting the estate of the bastard's mother as fully as if the
same bastard had been born in wedlock. An attempt was made to
give this act a retrospective effect, so as to divest real estate which
had passed by descent to the brothers of the bastard's mother
previously to the passage of the act.
But the court says, that the act must be construed as prospective
7 Met. 888; 4 Mass. 566; 16 Mass. 69; 12 Pick. 639.
3 5 Watts & S. 171.

2 4 McLean, 489.
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only. "We dare not say that more was intended, and by that accuse
the legislature of an attempt to break their promise made in the
presence of Almighty God, to support the constitution, which
declares that no citizen shall be deprived of his life, liberty or
property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
By the law of the land is meant a pre-existent rule of conduct.
Other taking than this would be an exercise of arbitrary power.
It was deemed necessary to insert a special provision in the Constitution of Pensylvania to enable the legislature to take private property
even for the public use, and on compensation made: but it was
not thought necessary to make special provision as to the taking of
private property from one individual and giving it to another, either
with or without compensation, because the general provision in the
bill of rights was thought sufficiently explicit.
In Jackson vs. Len,1 it was held that the legislature cannot
divest title vested in one set of heirs, and pass it to another set.
Nor (as was held in Jaclcson vs. Tlright ) can it take a title from
several heirs, and pass it to one.
In Greenough vs. Greenough,3 an act of the Pennsylvania legislature of 1848, relating to the signature of wills, was denied a retrospective effect, because it would divest titles to property. Under a law
of 1833 the courts had decided that a certain form of signature did
not satisfy the provisions of that law. By the act of 1848, the
legislature provided that in all cases arising under wills made
previously, which had not been already adjudicated by the courts,
such a signature as the courts had declared invalid under the law
of 1833 should be held good. This, therefore, on the face of it was
an act confirming invalidities in the form of a will. But the court
held that it affected something more than a form; that it divested
rights which had become vested in heirs upon the judicial interpretation of the act of 1833; that it differed from acts confirming mistakes or invalidities of forms in conveyances by deed, since in the
latter the seller receives a consideration and is under a moral obligation to perform his contract, to which the legislature may very
properly add a legal obligation, if it can do so, by correcting a mere
9 Cowen, 664.

24 Johns. 79.

3 11 Penn. (1 Jones,) 489.
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mistake of form without divesting equitable rights; but that in the
case of a will, the equities of the heirs and devisees are equal, and
after the vesting of the property in the former, it became not a correction of form, but a divesting of title to declare the will good. The
court also held this act a flagrant exercise of the judicial power in
interpreting an actwhich had once been interpreted by the courts ;
though it conceded the rights of the legislature to affix beforehand
its own meaning to its acts.
In Lessee of Good Zercher,' also, an act apparently curative
only, confirming a deed made by a married woman, which was
invalid from not complying with the provisions of the law applicable
to such deeds in Ohio, was held unconstitutional. Here the court
distinguishes between those cases where a bargain is made, and an
equitable interest transferred, and where the legislative act merely
cures its formal defects, and the cases where no equitable interest
passed originally, unless all the provisions of the law were fully
complied with.
As we have already seen, in Jones vs. Perrl,2 it was held a
divesting of title without due course of law, and by a judicial act,
for the legislature to authorize the guardian of an infant to sell his
estates for the payment of debts; and that in So7iervs. Mass. General
Bospital,3 it was held a divesting of title, also, for the legislature to
authorize the sale of an estate without providing for the interests of
the remainder-men.
There is a class of cases arising under general statutes abolishing
or modifying estates tail, which may properly be considered under
this head. By these statutes either estates tail are entirely abolished,
as in New York, or the tenant in tail has power to bar by deed
the estate tail, and all remainders and reversions expectant thereon.
And it has been abundantly decided that these statutes operate as
4
well upon estates vested before their passage as upon future estates.
So far as the interest of the tenant in tail is enlarged by the change
of his tenure, none of his rights are impaired. If he alone were
concerned, and the rights of none others affected, there could be no
2 10 Yerger, 59.
1 12 Ohio, 364.
4 2 Denio, 9; 1 Coms. 491; 5 Denio, 35; 4 Mass. 189.

3 3 Cush. 492.

TO CHANGE TITLES.

objection to general law converting his interest from a life estate
into a fee simple. But from the nature of things the rights of other
persons must be affected.
How are they affected? Is title or ownership unconstitutionally
divested ? Here is evidently a'taking away of some interest, indeed
a complete annihilation of it. The entire interest of the expectant
heirs and of the remainder-men, or reversioners, is destroyed. But
is this done unconstitutionally, without due course of law?
We find that at common law, previous to these statutes, this same
result might be produced by different means. The title of all those
parties could be barred by a common recovery. "It is an essential
quality of an estate tail that it may be barred by common recovery,
without this incident estates tail would become perpetual," says
C. J. Shaw in Weld vs. Williams.' The Massachusetts Statute of
1791 simply adopted this policy of the common law, and carried it
further by providing that a common deed should have this effect.
The Massachusetts courts seem to consider the Massachusetts law
as simply providing a more easy and efficacious way of doing that
which might have been done before,' or as affecting a remedy, as it
were, and not a substantial right. The court never appears to have
doubted or questioned its constitutionality as affecting vested rights.
Indeed the object of the law, as declared on its face, is not to abolish
estates tail, but to provide a more easy and simple mode of barring
them, and making them liable for the debts of the tenant in tail,
the Statute therefore requires that the deed having this effect shall
be "bona fide" and for valuable consideration. And in Sarle vs.
Sarle,3 a deed made without consideration and for the express purpose of only barring the estate tail, was held void as to the issue in
tail.
This is different from the nature of the statutes of some of the
other states, 4 as that of New York, which directly abolishes estates
tail.
It admits of question, whether under the New York and similar
statutes a constitutional right of the remainder-man, &c., is not
,13 Metc. 494.
3 5 Mass. 65.

vs. Russell, 15 Pick. 116.
I For Stats. see 4 Kent, 15, note, 5th edition.
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